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Intentional Infliction of Emotional




"It's time to recognize that the courts have created a new tort,"
William Prosser wrote in 1939. "It is something very like assault. It
consists of the intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering
in an extreme form."1 Today, the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress - sometimes called "outrage" or "outrageous
conduct" - is recognized in most states.' It also finds recognition
and legitimacy in the Restatement of the Law.' The Restatement
cautions, however, that "[tjhe law is still in a stage of development,
and the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined."1
4
During the past half-dozen years, libel and privacy plaintiffs
have begun attaching independent claims for intentional infliction to
their suits against media defendants.' Some plaintiffs sue only for
intentional infliction.6 Meanwhile, juries have become notoriously
unsympathetic to media defendants.'
* Assistant Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin-
Madison. B.A. (1971), M.A. (1976), Ph.D. (1980), University of Minnesota.
1. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV.
874, 874 (1939).
2. Not all authorities agree on precisely how many states. One recent study counted
38. Millard, Intentionally and Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress: Toward a Coherent
Reconciliation, 15 IND. L. REV. 617, 631 n.94 (1982). See also 38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright,
Shock, and Mental Disturbance § 4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as AM. JUR.].
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
4. Id. Comment c.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 48-58.
6. id.
7. In a recent well-publicized case, for example, a jury awarded damages to the Rev.
Jerry Falwell for intentional infliction of emotion distress, although not for libel. See Falwell v.
Hustler, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at 15, col. 1. In that case, Hustler magazine had pub-
lished a parody of a liquor advertisement depicting Jerry Falwell as a drunkard who had an
incestuous relationship with his mother.
Research has documented that from 1982 to 1984, media libel defendants won only 29 of
63 (46 percent) cases at trial, although even that represents an improvement over the previous
two years. Media defendants succeed about two-thirds of the time on appeal. The average
damage award at trial exceeded $2 million. Defamation Trials, Damage Awards and Appeals:
This article examines how the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress has been applied to American mass media defen-
dants. It begins by tracing the tort's development from its English
roots in the nineteenth century to its present status as an indepen-
dent cause of action. Next, the article examines suits against the
media for intentional infliction, the reasons for the claims and their
dispositions. Finally, it discusses the relationship of the tort to libel
and privacy, considers the implications of intentional infliction suits
for the media and suggests how the important interests in freedom of
expression and emotional tranquility might appropriately be
accommodated.
The study is limited to cases in which plaintiffs allege inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of ac-
tion. It does not address issues raised by the awarding of damages
for emotional distress resulting from a separate tort such as libel or
invasion of privacy. The study considers only cases in which emo-
tional distress, not physical illness or injury, has allegedly resulted
from defendants' conduct. Cases in which plaintiffs argue that defen-
dants' conduct is less than intentional or reckless will not be
considered.
II. Development of the Tort
Little more than a century ago, English and American courts
refused to recognize mental distress as recoverable damage except
where such harm was parasitic - that is, where it was part of the
harm caused by a separate, recognized tort. There could be no suit
either for emotional distress as an independent cause of action, or
where the only harm alleged was emotional distress. The principle
was well stated in the oft-cited case of Lynch v. Knight, where the
plaintiff alleged slander.
Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pre-
tend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that
alone; though where a material damage occurs, and is connected
with it, it is impossible a jury, in estimating it, should altogether
overlook the feelings of the party interested. 8
Two-Year Update (1982-1984), LDRC Bull., Nov. 15, 1984, at I [hereinafter cited as Defa-
mation Trials]. These damage awards tend to be very large - higher than the average awards
in medical malpractice and product liability cases. Socking It to the Press, EDITOR & PUB-
LISHER, April 7, 1984, at 31.
8. 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861). The concept of damages for emotional distress as a
"parasite" in other causes of action has survived powerfully. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), where the Supreme Court in a libel action concluded that "the
more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suf-
fering." Id. at 350.
The English courts, however, soon began to move away from the
rigid principle that there could be no recovery where harm was
caused by emotional distress alone. The "impact rule" provided the
first dent. Under this rule, plaintiffs could recover damages for phys-
ical illness or harm even though the physical harm resulted from
mental distress if the mental distress was triggered by some type of
physical impact on the plaintiff.' For example, if a runaway team of
horses raced past a pregnant bystander, and her terror led directly to
a miscarriage, she could maintain a suit only if the team ever so
slightly brushed her, even though the fright caused the harm.
The impact rule still immunized defendants who might have in-
flicted horrible mental distress so long as there was no physical con-
tact. That seeming unfairness was redressed partially in Wilkinson v.
Downton,10 a case in which a practical joker falsely told a woman
that her husband had been seriously injured in an accident. Her
shock manifested itself in vomiting and other physical consequences.
Realizing that the impact rule would bar recovery in such a situa-
tion, the court concluded that there can be a cause of action and
recovery when a defendant intentionally causes nervous shock that
leads to physical harm, even when there has been no impact.1"
The American courts were slower to recognize a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A pair of cases de-
cided at approximately the same time as Wilkinson reflected the re-
luctance. In Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., the New York Court of
Appeals refused to allow recovery for a woman who had become ill
and suffered a miscarriage after a runaway team of horses stopped
with her literally standing between the horses' heads." The court
concluded that fright alone cannot form the basis for an action, and
there can be no recovery for injury resulting therefrom. "That the
result may be nervous disease, blindness, insanity, or even a miscar-
riage, in no way changes the principle."' 3 The highest court in Mas-
sachusetts reached the same conclusion a year later.' 4 Both courts
hinted that the rule might be flexible where a defendant's tortious
conduct was intentional. Precisely such a situation presented itself to
the Iowa Supreme Court in 1902. A woman sued for the physical
9. Although it was technically decided on other grounds, the case generally credited
for the impact rule is Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888),
a negligence action in which a woman became ill after her buggy was nearly struck by a train.
A jury award in her favor was reversed on grounds that her illness was too remote from the
alleged cause.
10. [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
I1. Id. at 59.
12. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled by Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
13. 45 N.E. at 354.
14. Spade v. Lynn & B.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
harm she alleged resulted from the shock of seeing her husband en-
countering a night-time intruder in their house.15 The court, imply-
ing that this was a case of intentional misconduct by a defendant,
held that there could be recovery for physical harm flowing from
mental distress inflicted without impact."6
The logical next step would be to allow recovery for mental dis-
tress alone, with neither impact nor physical consequences, when the
distress is inflicted intentionally: The Arkansas Supreme Court took
that step in 1930. In this suit the plaintiff alleged mental suffering
was inflicted by defendants' threats to hang plaintiff if he didn't
leave the area.17 The Iowa Supreme Court followed two years later
in a case in which the plaintiff alleged mental suffering was caused
by pressure tactics used by a collection agency.' 8 Nevertheless, de-
velopment of the tort proceeded slowly. For example, the 1934 Re-
statement of Torts still refused to recognize intentional infliction of
emotional distress as an independent cause of action.' 9
Why were the courts so reluctant to allow the tort to expand?
The reasons fall into two broad categories: the nature of the harm
and problems of judicial procedure and administration.
Early cases reflected the view that emotional harm could not be
regarded as serious harm, that it is so intangible as to almost defy
proof, and/or that the link between emotional harm and subsequent
physical manifestations caused by such harm is so tenuous as to pre-
sent insurmountable problems of proximate cause." Some commen-
tators have warned that there may even be societal risk in allowing
the law to intervene to redress emotional distress.2 Professor Calvert
Magruder, in an influential article on emotional distress and tort
law, warned nearly fifty years ago that "it would be unfortunate if
the law closed all the safety valves through which irascible tempers
might legally blow off steam."2 Even the most recent Restatement
15. Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902).
16. Id.
17. Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930).
18. Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932). Such cases
contradicted dicta by the U.S. Supreme Court that there could be no recovery, at least under
federal common law, for mental suffering alone. Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612
(1916)(reversing award to plaintiff for mental anguish caused by defendant's failure promptly
to deliver casket and grave clothes intended for wife's burial).
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934).
20. See, e.g., Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. at 225-26;
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. at 354-55. See also Annot. 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959);
AM. JLJR., supra note 2, §§ 8-12; Handford, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress: Analysis
of the Growth of a Tort, 8 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Prosser, supra note 1; Vold, Tort
Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 18 NEB. L. BULL. 222 (1939).
21. See, e.g., Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 44
HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Lia-
bility for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944).
22. Magruder, supra note 21, at 1053.
of Torts, which does recognize an independent cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, notes that:
The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of
filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be
expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of
rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely incon-
siderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to inter-
vene in every case where someone's feelings are hurt.23
But perhaps the more substantial argument against liberalizing
the rules for recovery for emotional distress rested on policy consid-
erations. Simply put, judges worried that there might be no practical
way to limit the tort, that litigation would explode and that fraudu-
lent claims - encouraged by the intangible nature of the harm and
the difficulties of proof - would multiply. "4 The courts have been
refreshingly open about such concerns. For example, in Spade v.
Lynn & B.R. Co. the Massachusetts Supreme Court conceded that
mental suffering is legitimate harm and that it can cause physical
harm, but refused to permit recovery because of policy considera-
tions, especially the fear of a multitude of unjust claims.25 Prosser
calls these policy concerns "the only valid objection against recovery
for mental injury" and concludes that the danger is a real one that
"must be met.""6
The objections to recovery based solely on emotional distress
seem to have been overcome in several ways. First, concerns about
the seriousness of mental distress as a harm and its role as proximate
cause of physical harm have been met by scholarship arguing per-
suasively that mental distress is not always trivial and that it can
cause physical harm.27 Arguments that mental distress is not easily
subject to proof have been countered with the reply that medical
expertise can resolve the problem, and that courts have been per-
fectly willing to wrestle with precisely that problem when emotional
distress is alleged as parasitic harm.2"
Second, too many cases were appearing in which the application
of restrictive legal principles resulted in obvious injustices.29 Rather
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 Comment d.
24. See supra note 20 and authorities cited therein.
25. Spade v. Lynn & B.R. Co., 47 N.E. at 88-89.
26. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 328 (4th ed. 1971).
27. See, e.g., Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence without
Impact, 41 AM. L. REG. 141 (1902); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20
MICH. L. REV. 497 (1922); Prosser, supra note 1; Seizer, Psychological Stress and Legal
Concepts of Disease Causation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 951 (1971); Smith, supra note 21;
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921).
28. See generally supra note 27 and authorities cited therein, and Prosser, supra note
26, at 50.
29. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) is an obvious
than bar recovery entirely, courts began to stretch "loopholes" like
the impact rule to the breaking point. An ultimately absurd manipu-
lation of the impact rule occurred in the case of Christy Bros. Circus
v. Turnage, where the Georgia Court of Appeals found the requisite
impact to have occurred when a dancing circus horse evacuated its
bowels onto plaintiff's lap.30 Thus, Prosser has observed, the courts
began to develop rules which would allow for recognition of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress as a tort in its own right.31 Af-
ter all, "[i]t is the business of the courts to make precedent where a
wrong calls for redress, even if lawsuits must be multiplied. . .. ""
Indeed, the courts have developed legal principles that allow
suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress without opening
the floodgates of litigation and without continuing to require either
impact or physical manifestation of emotional harm. Those princi-
ples are discussed in the next section, and their acceptance by most
states 3 suggests that they have usefully balanced the competing
concerns.
III. General Principles
To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, a plaintiff must prove four elements of the cause of action: (1)
the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defen-
dant acted intentionally or recklessly; (3) the defendant's conduct
caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states the principle this way: "One
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from
it, for such bodily harm." 4 The majority view is that the cause of
action may arise where the emotional disturbance results from dis-
turbing or offensive language - including threats, false statements,
and language that is insulting, humiliating, scandalous, violent or
example.
30. 38 Ga. App. 58, 144 S.E. 680 (1928).
31. Prosser, supra note 26, at 56.
32. Id. at 328.
33. See supra note 2.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1). One observer has accused this portion
of the Restatement of being too influential, far more generating than restating the law. Theis,
The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Need for Limits on Liability, 27 DEPAUL
L. REV. 275 (1977). Theis further argues that there is no adequate justification for protection
of honor and dignity as independent interests. Id. at 278. Section 46(2) of the Restatement is
less relevant to this study. It provides that "[wihere such conduct is directed at a third person,
the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not
such distress results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is present at the time, if
such distress results in bodily harm." See also AM. JUR., supra note 2, §§ 4, 41-42.
abusive.3 5
As we shall clearly see when we consider cases brought against
the press, the most important requirement for a successful suit ap-
pears to be outrageous conduct. Although it appears somewhat cir-
cular, the Restatement's definition of outrageous has been enor-
mously influencial:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go be-
yond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atro-
cious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Gener-
ally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!" 36
Such conduct has been found in the following circumstances: a per-
son's committing suicide by cutting his throat in plaintiff's kitchen
while she was away;3 7 a hospital's display to a mother of her de-
ceased infant in a gallon jar of formaldehyde;3 8 and a food store
manager's placing a dead rat in a loaf of bread.39 Further, conduct
that might not otherwise be considered extreme or outrageous might
become such if the actor knows that the victim is peculiarly suscepti-
ble to emotional distress.4"
But fault is also important. Prosser, after surveying the cases,
concluded that in the great majority of suits in which recovery has
been allowed, the mental distress has been "inflicted intentionally,
either in the sense that the defendant desired to cause it, or that he
knew that it was substantially certain to follow from his conduct." '41
He also found some cases in which recovery was allowed, although
mental distress was not a certainty, if there was a "high degree of
probability" of its occurrence and the defendant consciously disre-
garded that probability.42 Recovery under such circumstances would
seem to be consistent with the Restatement's requirement that there
be either intentional or reckless conduct.43
Even if a defendant's conduct is outrageous and intentional, lia-
bility will not attach unless the emotional distress is severe. Mental
distress might include such responses as fright, horror, grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, indig-
35. AM. JUR., supra note 2, § 40.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 Comment d.
37. Blakely v. Shortal's Estate, 236 Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28 (1945).
38. Johnson v. Woman's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1975).
39. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 Comment f; AM. JUR., supra note 2, § 28.
41. Prosser, supra note 26, at 60.
42. Id.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1).
nity, anxiety or insult." But it must be far more than minor discom-
fort. In the words of the Restatement, "the law intervenes only
where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could
be expected to endure it."45 Although severe distress must be proven,
defendants must remember that it may be inferred in part from the
extreme and outrageous character of the offensive conduct.46
Questions of whether a defendant's conduct has been sufficiently
extreme and outrageous and whether a plaintiff's emotional distress
has been sufficiently severe to allow recovery are for the jury. But
first the judge must determine whether the allegations and evidence
create triable issues of fact on these questions.47 If not, dismissal and
summary judgment become appropriate - a fact which, as we shall
see, has become very important to media defendants.
IV. Intentional Infliction and the Media
At least thirty-five cases - all but six since 1978 - have been
reported in which plaintiffs alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress as an independent cause of action against mass media defen-
dants.48 Suits have arisen in fifteen states.49 In only three of the
cases was an intentional infliction claim the sole cause of action. In
most cases, plaintiffs alleged torts - generally libel or invasion of
privacy - in addition to intentional infliction as additional causes of
action. In two cases, the conduct alleged to be outrageous was the
manner in which a journalist gathered material. But most of the
cases stemmed from publication of stories, photographs and captions.
A. Results
Much as with libel cases, plaintiffs' success is correlated with
the level of the court." At least six intentional infliction cases have
gone to trial, and plaintiffs have won five with verdicts ranging from
$10,000 to $200,000. Three verdicts were appealed; two plaintiffs'
44. AM. JUR., supra note 2, §§ 53, 55; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 Com-
ment j.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 Comment j.
46. Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 Comments h & j; AM. JUR., supra note 2,
§ 7.
48. Cases addressing only technical questions - such as jurisdictional issues or appli-
cation of statutes of limitations - were excluded. The intentional infliction claims in some
way had to be considered on their merits. Also excluded are cases in which a claim for inten-
tional infliction was made against a non-media defendant for information disseminated
through the mass media.
49. Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennesse and Virginia. Twenty-
four of the cases were heard in state court, eleven in federal court.
50. See Defamation Trials, supra note 7.
verdicts were reversed and the defendant's verdict was upheld.5" Of
the remaining three, one was settled without damages on the condi-
tion that the defendant would not appeal. 52 No appeal has been re-
ported in the others. 53 Defendants have been more successful when
demurring, seeking dismissal or moving for summary judgment. In
twenty-two cases, judges have granted such requests. Plaintiffs ap-
pealed fourteen such orders and thirteen were affirmed. However, in
six other cases, judges denied defense motions for dismissal or sum-
mary judgment. At least one of those denials was appealed and re-
versed. 54 Only two intentional infliction claims to date have with-
stood appeal.55
If all the cases are classified in terms of wins and losses for
media defendants, such defendants have won just over seventy per-
cent of the cases (twenty-five cases) and lost thirty percent (ten
cases). To summarize, the losses include three unreversed verdicts
(although one was subsequently settled), six denials of dismissal or
summary judgment5" and one injunction against future tortious con-
duct.5 7 Further, the fact that intentional infliction claims are being
treated as distinct causes of action is illustrated by at least three
cases in which emotional distress causes of action survived while libel
and/or privacy claims failed.58
51. Cape Publications v. Bridges, 423 So.2d 426 (Fla. App. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 239 (1983); Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1980); Cole v. Dun & Bradstreet Pub.
Corp., No. 80-1015 (6th Cir., Oct. 22, 1981, unpublished slip opinion). In Cole, the trial judge
had directed a verdict for the defendant.
52. Marley v. IRE (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1981). The case, though not reported, is discussed
in THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW, June-July 1981, at 30, and October-November 1981, at
28.
53. Clifford v. Hollander, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2201 (N.Y. Civil Ct. 1980); Falwell
v. Hustler, Some See Threat in Non-Libel Verdict for Falwell, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at
15, col. I (W.D. Va., Dec. 8, 1984). See also Rev. Falwell Loses Libel Verdict, But Wins
Damages, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Dec. 15, 1984, at 34, and Distressing, Time, Dec. 24, 1984,
at 55. As of this writing, there has been no time for appeal of the Falwell case.
54. Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 A.D.2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1970).
55. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Vescovo v. New Way Enterprises,
Ltd., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1976).
56. Houck v. Forum Int'l Ltd., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 6; Martin v. Municipal
Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Pierson v. News Group Publications, 549 F.
Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 897 (W.D.
Mich. 1983); Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Ves-
covo v. New Way Enterprises, Ltd., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1976).
57. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1973).
58. In Houck v. Forum Int'l Ltd., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 6, a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress survived summary judgment while a privacy claim did
not. In Marley v. IRE, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW, June-July 1981, at 30, a jury
awarded damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but not for libel or invasion of
privacy. In Falwell v. Hustler, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at 15, col. 1, a jury awarded dam-
ages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but not for libel, where Hustler magazine
published a parody of a liquor advertisement depicting the Rev. Jerry Falwell as a drunkard
who had an incestuous relationship with his mother.
B. Why Defendants Win
The "outrageousness" requirement can be credited for roughly
sixty percent of the mass media defendants' legal successes. The
power of this barrier to recovery is illustrated by courts' refusal to
find sufficiently outrageous conduct when a journalist photographed
plaintiffs' deceased children who had suffocated in a refrigerator,59
when a newspaper allegedly placed an undercover narcotics agent in
serious danger by purposely publishing his photograph, 60 or when a
newspaper ran the name and address of a murder witness while the
suspect remained at large." On the other hand, the standard's im-
precision might be the cause of the courts' refusal to grant summary
judgment when a newspaper, with the United States Army's permis-
sion, took photographs showing plaintiff Army officer in allegedly
embarrassing situations during prisoner-of-war training; 2 and where
a magazine published a photograph, along with an unflattering cap-
tion, of plaintiff wearing a Mummer's costume in a parade. 3
Giveri the demands of the "outrageousness" requirement, it is
not surprising that few cases have reached the questions of either the
defendant's fault or the severity of the emotional harm. Where these
requirements have been addressed, they have been helpful to
defendants. 4
At least ten cases have either directly or indirectly addressed
the first amendment problems raised by tort actions against the me-
dia for intentional infliction of emotional distress, But only three
cases appear to have been decided specifically on constitutional
grounds, and defendants won them all. Two of the three were
brought by sexual assault victims whose names were revealed as part
of media coverage of open court proceedings.65 One of the victims
was testifying against her attacker apparently because the state had
59. Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 A.D.2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1970).
60. Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1980).
61. Hood v. Naeter Bros. Pub. Co., 562 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. App. 1978).
62. Pierson v. News Group Publications, 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
63. Martin v. Municipal Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The caption
said "Dead animal of the month: A New Year's tribute here to all the ostriches who gave their
tails to make the world free for closet transvestites from South Philly to get themselves stink-
ing drunk. Have a nice year."
64. See, e.g., Reichenbach v. Call-Chronicle, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1438 (Common
Pleas Pa. 1982) (newspaper acted neither intentionally nor recklessly when it ran story which
graphically described death of plaintiff's wife in story on hospital emergency room); Beresky v.
Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (1978) (plaintiff failed to allege sufficiently
severe emotional distress from newspaper article reporting son's legal problems and death from
drug overdose); Cole v. Dun & Bradstreet Pub. Corp., No. 80-1015 (6th Cir., Oct. 22, 1981,
unpublished slip opinion) (no evidence that defendant intended to harm plaintiff or knew she
might be especially sensitive); Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701
(1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (no evidence of reckless or knowing conduct).
65. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Television, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2074 (Fla. App.
1983); Williams v. New York Times, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1494 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1984).
assured her that her identity would not be publicized. The third
case resulted from newspaper coverage of a hearing to determine
whether the plaintiff's conviction for indecent exposure should be
expunged. 7
Central to the outcome of all three cases was Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, a privacy case in which the United States Supreme
Court held that states "may not impose sanctions on the publication
of truthful information contained in official court records open to
public inspection."6 8 All three courts noted that the plaintiffs were
seeking redress for accurate accounts of what transpi.'ed during open
court proceedings, and therefore it would be inconsistent with the
first amendment to find liability. 9 On the other hand, in Galella v.
Onassis, the court specifically rejected a journalist's argument that
his conduct in hounding Jacqueline Onassis and her family was pro-
tected by the first amendment. The court stated, "The proposition
that the First Amendment gives the press wide liberty to engage in
any sort of conduct, no matter how offensive, in gathering news has
been flatly rejected."70
Although in all of these cases common law principles were suffi-
cient to protect defendants. Other courts have indicated their sensi-
tivity to constitutional interests by noting that intentional infliction
claims may interfere with the media's privilege to publish news in
the public interest.71 One court appears to have linked constitutional
concerns with the very definition of outrageousness:
Where there is a strong public policy which would justify or ex-
plain the actor's conduct, that public policy is a relevant factor
66. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Television, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2074. The court
also chastised the state and the television station for their conduct. Id. at 2075-76.
67. Shifflet v. Thomson Newspapers, 69 Ohio St. 2d 179, 431 N.E.2d 1014 (1982). In
a fourth case, Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, constitutional
considerations were at least implicit. Plaintiff, a public figure, sued for libel and intentional
infliction and conceded that if he could not prove "actual malice" as defined by New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), both causes of action would fail.
68. 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975). In Cox Broadcasting, the Supreme Court reversed on
First Amendment grounds a decision against the defendant in a privacy action brought by
surviving parents for publication of the identity of their deceased daughter, a rape-murder
victim, where the information was truthful and came from open court records. Cox Broadcast-
ing was also cited by an appellate court in Missouri in an intentional infliction case brought by
a murder witness whose identity was publicized by a newspaper while the suspect was at large.
Hood v. Naeter Bros. Pub. Co., 562 S.W.2d at 772. The court had already disposed of the case
by concluding that the conduct was insufficiently outrageous, and simply observed in a footnote
that Cox Broadcasting would be relevant. Id. at 772 n.l.
69. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Television, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2074-75; Wil-
liams v. New York Times, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1494-95; Shifflet v. Thomson Newspa-
pers, 69 Ohio St.2d at 184, 431 N.E.2d at 1018.
70. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 220 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). The district court's
position on the First Amendment was upheld by the court of appeals. 487 F.2d at 995.
71. Cape Publications v. Bridges, 423 So.2d at 428; Costlow v. Cusimano, 311
N.Y.S.2d at 95-96; Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Record, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J.
1978).
in the determination of whether the conduct is extreme or outra-
geous. . . . The newspaper serves an important public purpose
when it features newsworthy articles that inform the public
about medical advances and procedures.72
C. Related Torts
Several scholars have correctly observed that the torts of libel,
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress
overlap to a certain degree because all three are aimed either exclu-
sively or in part at redressing mental suffering. 73 Some authors have
gone so far as to predict that intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress may actually absorb the libel and privacy torts because it may
be applied in a broader range of situations.74 Although that does not
seem to be occurring," the three torts are so frequently combined as
causes of action within individual suits that their similarities and dif-
ferences deserve a closer look.
1. Libel. - Although libel and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress resemble each other in that both may result from the
publication of false statements and both require some showing of
fault by plaintiffs, 76 they differ in important and fundamental ways.
First, because the intentional infliction tort protects against emo-
tional distress even when there is no allegation of harm to reputa-
tion, it may involve publication of truthful material. An intentional
infliction suit may stem not only from publication but also from
newsgathering misconduct. In other words, conduct may be actiona-
ble as intentional infliction of emotional distress even without defa-
mation or publication. 77 Further, the plaintiff in an intentional inflic-
72. Reichenbach v. Call-Chronicle, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1440-41.
73. See, e.g., Magruder, supra note 21, at 655; Mead, Suing Media for Emotional
Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24, 44-51
(1983); Stevens, Media Tort Liability for Emotional Distress, 54 JOURNALISM Q. 157 (1977);
Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962). See also Ste-
vens, The "Tort of Outrage": A New Legal Problem for the Press, NEWSPAPER RESEARCH J.,
Spring 1984, at 27.
74. Wade, supra note 73, at 1124-25. Stevens, supra note 73, at 160, finds that predic-
tion "debatable."
75. Mead, "Suing Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort
Law Evolution," (1982) (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison School of Journalism
and Mass Communication). Mead analyzed 484 libel, privacy and intentional infliction cases
between 1977 and 1981. Although he found that use of the intentional infliction tort had in-
creased significantly during that time frame, he also found that less than 4 percent of the cases
involved that claim. That led Mead to conclude that there is "no great rush to charge journal-
ists with infliction of emotional distress, but combined pleadings are gaining increased utiliza-
tion and success." Id. at 26. See also, Mead, supra note 73, at 61-63.
76. In libel, there can be no liability without fault. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. at 347. In intentional infliction, the defendant's conduct must have been intentional or
reckless. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.
77. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
tion case apparently need not be identified as a libel plaintiff must
be. Although no case has yet directly addressed this question, no
case has been dismissed on grounds that the plaintiff wasn't identi-
fied.78 Indeed, the victim of emotional distress may be a totally un-
foreseen third party.79
Although both of these torts require a showing of fault, the
fault requirements for intentional infliction suits are more demand-
ing than those of libel suits. All plaintiffs in intentional infliction
suits must show that defendants have acted intentionally or reck-
lessly. In libel cases only public officials and public figures must
show recklessness; most others need prove only negligence.8" The
fault requirements differ in another, more subtle way. In libel, the
requisite fault apparently refers to a journalist's culpability vis-a-vis
the truth of information. That is, the crucial question appears to be
not whether a journalist published something when he knew or
should have known that it would be libelous, but rather whether he
knew or should have known that it was false.81 Intentional infliction
plaintiffs must prove that the defendant specifically intended to in-
flict emotional distress, or recklessly disregarded a high probability
that such distress would result.82 In a sense, then, the relevant culpa-
bility in libel focuses on the raw material which is subsequently
claimed to be libelous; the relevant culpability in intentional inflic-
tion cases focuses on the resulting harm. The latter would appear
more difficult to prove.
Finally, libel plaintiffs may succeed upon proving the requisite
fault and providing evidence of some harm. But intentional infliction
plaintiffs also must prove that the defendant's conduct was "outra-
geous" and that the harm suffered was severe.83 The first amend-
ment is a defense to libel actions; it has not been similarly recog-
78. See, e.g., Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.2d 619 (Fla. App. 1982) (spouse of deceased airline
pilot sued when book described deceased as ghost who had appeared on several airline flights;
dismissed because conduct was not outrageous).
79. See, e.g., Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Record, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J.
1978) (plaintiff under indictment for murder claimed that inaccurate story about state su-
preme court decision gave him false hope which subsequent correction turned to despondency
and depression; dismissed on grounds that conduct was not outrageous and plaintiff could not
allege sufficient fault).
80. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 342, 347.
81. Public figures and officials must prove that a defamatory falsehood was published
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In Gertz, the Supreme Court may
have implicitly recognized this subtlety in the fault requirement when it noted that its newly
announced standard for private-figure plaintiffs applied "[a]t least . . . where . . . the sub-
stance of the defamatory statement 'makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.' " 418
U.S. at 348. The Restatement comes directly to grips with the matter, summarizing the consti-
tutional defense as requiring fault in regard to both the falsity and defamatory nature of the
offending statement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 580A, 580B.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 Comment i.
83. Id. § 46.
nized universally as a defense in intentional infliction cases. But the
high barriers of the fault, outrageousness and severe harm require-
ments may well provide a more powerful defense to intentional inflic-
tion suits than anything other than an absolutist interpretation of the
First Amendment ever could.
2. Privacy. - In several respects, the intentional infliction tort
seems to resemble tortious invasion of privacy more than it resembles
libel. The interest it seeks to protect concerns how a plaintiff feels
about himself rather than how others feel about the plaintiff.8" Fur-
ther, like the privacy tort, intentional infliction encompasses both
publication and gathering of information. But analysis and compari-
son become easier if we consider the different strains of the privacy
tort separately. 85
When an intentional infliction suit is brought because of the
way in which a journalist has obtained information, the action re-
sembles an invasion of privacy suit for intrusion on a person's soli-
tude or seclusion. The constitution is not a defense to either cause of
action. 8' But because of the outrageousness requirement, a claim for
intentional infliction would appear to be more difficult for a plaintiff
to prove than a claim for invasion of privacy. 87 On the other hand,
intentional infliction may be usefully broader for plaintiffs. Mental
intrusions such as continuous badgering of a reluctant source by a
reporter might be more easily actionable under an intentional inflic-
tion theory than under a privacy theory. Further, an intentional in-
fliction suit might be possible where a defendant's conduct has made
possible physical intrusion or trespass by a third party. For example,
although the case did not technically involve intentional infliction, in
Mikan v. Valley Publishing, Inc. the parents of a child charged with
84. This is generally how Donald Gillmor and Jerome Barron distinguish privacy and
libel interests. GILLMOR AND BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 311 (4th ed. 1984). See
also Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: an Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
85. The analysis does not include appropriation of one's name or likeness for commer-
cial purposes because it is less directly relevant here. However, at least one intentional inflic-
tion suit appears to have been rooted in part in the plaintiff's dismay over an author's failure to
consult her while writing a book about her deceased spouse. Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.2d 619 (Fla.
App. 1982).
86. "The First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity
from torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering." Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). "Crimes and torts committed in newsgathering are not
protected." Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
87. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Florida Pub. Co., 319 So.2d 100 (Fla. App. 1975). Plaintiff
sued for trespass, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress where a
newspaper photographer, at the invitation of fire and police authorities, entered plaintiff's
burned out home while she was gone and photographed a silhouette left on the floor by the
body of plaintiff's daughter who was killed in the fire. Plaintiff learned of the death by reading
the paper. She lost on all of the claims, but the court found that the intentional infliction claim
failed because it met none of the requisite elements of the tort. 319 So.2d at 112.
juvenile delinquency sued for harassment they claimed resulted after
a newspaper identified them.88 And at least two magazines have
been sued for revealing females' names and addresses in connection
with sexually explicit content.89
Intentional infliction suits may also resemble false light invasion
of privacy suits. In many respects the similarities and differences
parallel those between intentional infliction and libel. The major sim-
ilarity is that false light privacy and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress both require plaintiffs to show a high degree of fault
by defendants. The fault requirement has been constitutionalized for
false light actions; plaintiffs must prove that defendants published
"with knowledge of . . . falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth."90 Although this standard is the same required of public offi-
cials and public figures in libel actions, it is a more demanding stan-
dard than must be met in libel cases by most private-figure plain-
tiffs.91 Since the Supreme Court has not explicitly required any
public-private figure distinction in the constitutional defense to false
light privacy, 92 the fault requirement for false light plaintiffs does
not vary with plaintiffs' public or private status and in that respect
resembles the fault requirement for intentional infliction plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, intentional infliction would still appear the more
difficult of the two causes of action to maintain. The fault issue not-
withstanding, a plaintiff in an intentional infliction case must still
show outrageousness and severe harm. These requirements further
distinguish the torts because their effect is to preclude intentional
infliction suits by plaintiffs who have been placed in laudatory false
light.9" Also the fault required in false light cases, as in libel cases,
focuses on defendants' knowledge of falsity while the fault require-
ment in intentional infliction cases focuses on intent to cause the re-
sulting harm.94 The intentional infliction tort encompasses a greater
range of conduct than the false light tort because it extends to false
88. 38 Or. App. 287, 589 P.2d 1201 (1979). Plaintiffs lost at least in part because they
sued under a theory of tortious nuisance. The court held that there was no such tort and noted
that plaintiff had failed to allege intentional conduct.
89. Clifford v. Hollander, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2201 (N.Y. Civil Ct. 1980); Houck
v. Forum Int'l Ltd., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 6.
90. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
91. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz did leave states the choice
of whether to impose lesser fault requirements on private figure plaintiffs, but most states have
done so. For a useful summary of state fault requirements in libel actions, see 1 COMMUNICA-
TIONS LAW 159-67 (PLI course handbook 1983).
92. The court sidestepped an opportunity to do so in Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co.,
419 U.S. 245 (1974) (holding journalist liable where he fabricated portions of story about
surviving family of accident victim).
93. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), is an excellent example. The magazine
story triggering the suit actually made plaintiff look heroic during an ordeal when a family
was held hostage by an escaped prisoner.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
material even when there is no false light; but again, the advantage
of the greater range would seem to be more than balanced by the
major proof requirements for plaintiffs.
Many intentional infliction suits stem from situations that are
also likely to trigger invasion of privacy suits for disclosure of private
facts.9 5 In fact, the proof requirements of the two torts resemble
each other rather closely. Although plaintiffs in disclosure cases ap-
parently have no obligation to prove "severe" harm or intent to in-
flict emotional suffering, they must provide evidence of conduct
much resembling outrageousness. 6 As the influential decision in Si-
dis v. F-R Pub. Corp. noted, a defendant could lose a disclosure case
where "[r]evelations (are) so intimate and so unwarranted in view of
the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of
decency."
97
Two major defenses are available in disclosure cases. The first
amendment is a defense in a relatively narrow band of circumstances
- those where a defendant has publicized truthful information law-
fully obtained from open public records.98 A far broader common
law defense is newsworthiness: "[tihe common law has long recog-
nized that the public has a proper interest in learning about many
matters. When the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate
public concern, there is no invasion of privacy."99
95. See, e.g., Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 A.D.2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1970) (photo-
graphs of plaintiffs' deceased children after they suffocated in refrigerator); Cape Pub. Inc. v.
Bridges, 423 So.2d 426 (Fla. App. 1980) (photo of plaintiff covered only by towel after rescue
from kidnapper); Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich. App. 725, 300 N.W.2d 687
(1980) (story revealing that plaintiff's husband may have been with another woman when he
was killed in fire); Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Television, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2074 (Fla.
App. 1983); Williams v. New York Times, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1494 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1984) (media revealed names of rape victims).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF'TORTS § 652D.
97. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). Sidis, a former
child prodigy, sued when the New Yorker published a story resurrecting his background after
he had grown up. Interestingly, he initially also sued for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, but the court refused to recognize the cause of action because that interest, "however
real, is one not yet protected by the law." Id. at 810.
98. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). The court noted that inter-
ests in privacy fade when material appears in public records, and that states "may not impose
sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to
public inspection." Id. at 495. The court has been similarly protective of the press in other
contexts. See Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (court order forbid-
ding publication of name or photo of alleged juvenile delinquent unconstitutional where name
was obtained during open court hearing); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(court order forbidding publication of information obtained in open court is unconstitutional);
Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (state law forbidding newspaper publication of juve-
nile crime suspect unconstitutional where newspaper obtained name lawfully). None of these
latter cases, however, involved tortious invasion of privacy.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D Comment d. The Restatement summa-
rizes the disclosure tort as follows: "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not
of legitimate concern to the public." Id. § 652D.
Whether the constitutional and newsworthiness defenses apply
to intentional infliction suits remains an open question. But there
would appear no logical reason why the constitutional defense would
not apply. Indeed, the defense would become meaningless if it fore-
closed one tort action but not the other. 100 The same could be said of
the newsworthiness defense. One commentator has labeled the stan-
dard of Sidis the "unconscionability rule" since it apparently demar-
cates the point at which the newsworthiness test will fail.'' If the
newsworthiness defense does apply in intentional infliction cases, it
would logically fail when a plaintiff proves outrageousness.' 2 There-
fore, the availability of the defense would seem at first glance to be
an irrelevant issue. Such may not be the case, however, if courts
reason that publication would be outrageous but for the fact that the
material is newsworthy.0 3
Finally, the torts differ in the sense that the disclosure tort "can
be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is in-
vaded.' 01 4 Nothing in the reported cases seems to similarly limit in-
tentional infliction actions, although the issue has not been directly
addressed in the cases most closely resembling disclosure cases.05
Obviously, if intentional infliction suits are not thus limited, defen-
dants are vulnerable to a wider range of plaintiffs.
V. Emotional Distress as a Distinct Interest
Although the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
often seems to resemble libel and privacy torts, an examination of
the cases reveals that plaintiffs in fact use it to seek redress for con-
100. The constitutional defense was implicitly used in Brennan v. Globe Newspaper, 9
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1147, 1149 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1982), to justify summary judgment for
the defendant where the suit stemmed from an article accurately reporting from public records
that a former mayor had been indicted and acquitted of conspiracy and had been delinquent in
paying his taxes. It has been used explicitly. See also supra text accompanying notes 65-72.
101. Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
1205, 1262 (1976). The Sidis rule is stated in text accompanying note 97 supra.
102. See Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 300 N.W.2d at 691 (journalist's conduct was
not actionable because news account of fire-related deaths was not of extreme character);
Cape Pub. v. Bridges, 423 So.2d at 427-28 (newspaper's conduct may have been in bad taste,
but courts "should be reluctant to interfere with a newspaper's privilege to publish news in the
public interest.").
103. That seems to have been precisely the reasoning of the court in Reichenbach v.
Call-Chronicle, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1440, where the court apparently found the news-
paper's conduct not to have been outrageous precisely because the material could reasonably
have been considered newsworthy: "Where there is a strong public policy which would justify
or explain the actor's conduct, that public policy is a relevant factor in the determination of
whether the conduct is extreme or outrageous."
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521.
105. Without having the courts raise this issue, several plaintiffs have sued for publica-
tion of material about third parties. Beresky v. Teschner, 64 I11. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979
(1978) (suit by parents for story about deceased son); Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.2d 619 (Fla. App.
1982) (suit by surviving family for book about deceased father); Costlow v. Cusimano, 34
A.D.2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1970) (suit by parents over photos of deceased children).
duct which neither harms reputation nor invades privacy. The cases
can be classified into at least four categories.
Several cases indicate that plaintiffs are attempting to use inten-
tional infliction as a cause of action resulting from media conduct
which is clearly not intrusive, false or defamatory, and which, be-
cause of its reasonably obvious newsworthiness or public nature, is
not actionable as disclosure invasion of privacy. Rather, the material
is offensive primarily because it appears to be thoughtless, tasteless
or insensitive. Thus, for example, intentional infliction claims have
been asserted where a newspaper covering a hostage situation ran a
photograph of the hostage rushing from an apartment building cov-
ered only by a towel, 106 and where the media have identified rape
victims during public court proceedings.
10 7
Another cluster of cases involves material that is apparently ac-
curate and is neither private nor extremely personal. This material is
not likely to be considered by the community-at-large to be either
strikingly thoughtless or insensitive. It could, however, be under-
standably upsetting to the specific individuals involved. Thus inten-
tional infliction has been alleged where a newspaper graphically de-
scribed unsuccessful efforts to save plaintiff's wife's life in an
emergency room, although the story fictionalized her name.10 8 News-
papers have also been sued for stories reporting the death of plain-
tiffs' son from a drug overdose 09 and for reporting that plaintiff's
husband had died in a cottage fire and that a second body removed
from the rubble was that of a woman obviously not his wife. a0
A third group of cases comprises those resulting from media
conduct subjecting people to fear of physical harm or making them
obvious targets for mental harassment. Thus suits resulted when a
newspaper reported the name and address of a robbery-murder wit-
ness while the suspect remained at large, 1 and when a newspaper
purposely ran a photograph of an undercover narcotics agent with a
caption saying "Know Your Enemies."'1 2 The physical risks appear
obvious, although in neither case was the plaintiff able to surmount
106. Cape Pub. Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So.2d 426 (Fla. App. 1982).
107. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Television, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2074 (Fla. App.
1983). The court specifically noted the real basis of the suit when it chastised the broadcaster:
"Although we affirm the trial court in all respects, we do so reluctantly because the informa-
tion disclosed during the television broadcast appears to us to have been completely unneces-
sary to the story being presented. . . . We deplore the lack of sensitivity to the rights of others
that is sometimes displayed by such unfettered exercise of first amendment rights." Id. at
2075; Williams v. New York Times, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1494 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1984).
108. Reichenbach v. Call-Chronicle, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1438 (Pa. Common Pleas
1982).
109. Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (1978).
110. Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich. App. 725, 300 N.W.2d 687 (1980).
Ill. Hood v. Naeter Bros. Pub. Co., 562 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. App. 1978).
112. Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1980).
the outrageousness barrier. Suits also resulted when a magazine ran
a nude photo misidentifying the subject as plaintiff with sufficient
details so that she received loathsome, horrifying calls, 11 3 and where
a magazine sufficiently identified the female author of an erotic arti-
cle so that she had to leave her home temporarily to escape obscene
and threatening phone calls.' 14
A final category of cases involves material that is inaccurate but
seemingly harmless. The problem arises because the plaintiff has a
special, personal interest in the material. Thus plaintiffs have sued
for such material as a photograph that plaintiff considered to be an
"ugly representation" because it made her appear "stout"," 5 and for
an inaccurate story about a supreme court opinion the correction of
which left plaintiff extremely disappointed." 6
A thread common to all four of these categories is an attempt to
use the courts to legally punish what until recently might merely
have been considered unfortunate breaches of journalistic ethics. In-
accurate, insensitive knee-jerk reporting has long been a concern of
the journalistic profession itself. As one commentator recently noted,
"The folklore of the news business is mostly hard-nosed and macho,
disparaging expression of pity or empathy, or anything that smacks
of softness. Perhaps it's time for journalists to start honoring com-
passion more and cynicism less.""' 7
Journalists may now expect at least occasionally to be sum-
moned to court to answer for their conduct where they thoughtlessly
report such information as the names of crime victims and witnesses,
113. Clifford v. Hollander, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2201 (N.Y. Civil Ct. 1980). See
also Vescovo v. New Way Enterprises, Ltd., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1976),
where a newspaper ran an advertisement saying "'Hot Lips-Deep Throat; Sexy young bored
housewife; Norma" and gave plaintiff's address. Plaintiff alleged that she subsequently re-
ceived lewd letters and requests for sex, that more than 100 people demanded to see her, and
that more than 150 vehicles either stopped in front of or slowly cruised by her home, thus
harassing, annoying and frightening her family.
114. Houck v. Forum Int'l Ltd., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
See also Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc. 127 So.2d 715 (Fla. App. 1961), ostensibly a
privacy suit but in which plaintiff claimed she was "outraged" by flood of telephone calls after
newspaper article said "Wanna hear a sexy telephone voice? Call - and ask for
Louise." The appeals court reversed dismissal. For a case in which a newspaper reporter sued
his employer for intentional infliction by allegedly refusing to print his stories, publishing his
confidential sources, demoting him and generally rendering him a pariah, see Lagies v. Copley
I10 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980).
115. McManamon v. Daily Freeman, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1930).
116. Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Record, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156 (D. N.J. 1978).
117. Goodwin, The Ethics of Compassion, QUILL, November 1983, at 38, 40. Journal-
ists have already had a taste of the impact of courts putting legal coercion behind ethical
guidelines. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (overturning court order
part of which had initially required journalists covering criminal case to abide by previously
voluntary fair trial-free press guidelines); and Federated Publications v. Swedberg, 633 P.2d
74 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982) (upholding court order condition-
ing press access to preliminary hearing on journalists' promise to follow heretofore voluntary
fair trial-free press guidelines).
especially where such information does not come from public
records,"' or where they insensitively inform people of personal trag-
edies,11 9 or constantly hound sources.120 Under an intentional inflic-
tion theory, one can visualize attempts to sue if journalists should
reveal the identities of confidential sources, or when journalists have
gathered information deceptively. 2'
How much protection, then, should be available to media defen-
dants in intentional infliction suits? In Cox Broadcasting the Su-
preme Court rested its holding on the rationale that by placing infor-
mation in the public domain in court records, "the state must be
presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby be-
ing served."' 22 Consequently, the court was "reluctant to embark on
a course that would make public records generally available to the
media but forbid their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of
the supposed reasonable man. '  Cox Broadcasting might techni-
cally be confined to its factual context - the publication of informa-
tion from open court records. But the court's rationale would seem
legitimately to support application of the principle to media reports
of any open, public record. Likewise, there would seem to be no rea-
son why the same rationale shouldn't apply to information obtained
118. Journalists are apparently becoming seriously concerned about just such situations.
For example, the National News Council recently expressed concern about what it called in-
creasing legal efforts to restrict the availability of such information, but called concern over
the impact of such revelations widespread and valid. "Where fear of harassment or retaliation
is as prevalent as it clearly is among many victims or witnesses, it is insufficient for editors to
shrug off criticism of indiscriminate publication on the ground that they have encountered few
cases where the fear is warranted," the council said. Council Warns that New Laws May
Restrict Crime Reporting, QUILL, December 1983, at 44 (National News Council Report).
For an account of how real the dangers are, see The Witness as Target, TIME, Dec. 19, 1983,
at 65. Journalists have also been faulted for reporting that endangers participants during ac-
tual crimes. See, e.g., C. Christians, K. Rotzoll and M. Fackler, MEDIA ETHICS 60-62 (1983)
for an example of how a reporter may have endangered the life of a hostage.
119. No reported case against the media has involved precisely such a circumstance. But
plaintiffs have been successful in actions for similar conduct against non-media defendants.
See, e.g., Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming
verdict for intentional infliction where team physician incorrectly told newspaper columnist
that plaintiff had fatal blood disease); Muniz v. United Hospitals Medical Center Presbyterian
Hospital, 153 N.J. Super. 79, 379 A.2d 57 (1977) (reversing dismissal where plaintiff alleged
that defendant called mother while still in hospital to report that her premature infant was
dead and where hospital took three weeks to verify death and locate body). Journalistic ap-
proximations of similar situations are relatively easy to find. See, e.g., Coleman, A Day in the
Life, QUILL, July-August 1983, at 22: Hart and Johnson, Fire Storm in Missoula, QUILL,
May 1979, at 19.
120. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), is an obvious, albeit ex-
treme, example.
121. No intentional infliction cases could be found involving such situations, but such
circumstances could easily lead to such a suit. An application already being suggested in legal
journals involves racial insults. See Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982), and Richard-
son, Racism: A Tort of Outrage, 61 OR. L. REv. 267 (1982). Contra, Heins, Banning Words:
A Comment on "Words that Wound," 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1983).
122. 420 U.S. at 495.
123. Id. at 496.
through attendance at open government meetings.'" Consequently,
the constitution ought to bar intentional infliction suits where the
offending conduct involves no more than publication of truthful in-
formation obtained from open, public records or from open govern-
mental proceedings. In such contexts, media conduct must be consid-
ered to be inherently less than outrageous.
Situations in which the media accurately report false informa-
tion obtained from open records or government proceedings raise a
slightly different question, one not directly answered by Cox Broad-
casting. However, such publication would generally be protected
from actions for libel by the qualified privilege of reporting.125 If
such conduct would be accordingly privileged against actions for li-
bel, it ought to be likewise privileged against actions for intentional
infliction. It should be considered inherently less than outrageous
conduct. And this principle ought to hold whether or not the plaintiff
explicitly sues for libel.
Such reasoning suggests a broader principle: whenever the same
course of conduct leads to claims for intentional infliction plus libel
and/or invasion of privacy, proof that the conduct is privileged under
statute, common or constitutional law against either the libel or pri-
vacy claims should be considered proof that the conduct is also privi-
leged against the intentional infliction claim. This principle should
also apply vhere plaintiffs fail to state claims for relief on theories of
libel or invasion of privacy but where, given the defendant's conduct,
such claims are obviously appropriate. That is, an intentional inflic-
tion action under such circumstances should fail where a defendant
can show that the plaintiff's claim is in reality one for libel or inva-
sion of privacy and that the defendant's conduct would be privileged
under such a theory of liability.12 6 Such a principle would help guar-
124. The court implied as much in Cox Broadcasting, noting that the "developing law
surrounding the tort of invasion of privacy recognizes a privilege in the press to report the
events of judicial proceedings." 420 U.S. at 493. The court has especially recognized the First
Amendment interest in open judicial proceedings. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980), Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S.
596 (1982), Press Enterprise v. Riverside County Superior Court, 52 U.S.L.W. 4113 (1984).
And the court has stringently limited the use of gag orders to prevent the media from publish-
ing what they have learned from observation in open court. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977); Prosser, supra note 26, at 792;
Gillmor & Baron, supra note 84, at 261-66.
126. Where plaintiffs have stated claims on multiple theories of liability, some courts
have already followed such logic. See Lewis v. Time Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Cal. 1979),
affid 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983) (libel, privacy and intentional infliction claims all held to
amount to claim for relief for defamation); Meyer v. Hubbell, 117 Mich. App. 699, 324
N.W.2d 139 (1982) (court refused to allow plaintiff to add intentional infliction claim where
defendants' circulation of court opinion was privileged against libel suit and therefore not ex-
treme or outrageous); Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (plaintiff concedes that if libel claim fails so must inten-
tional infliction claim). See also, Defamatory Words Can Be Quoted, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
antee that intentional infliction be a truly independent cause of ac-
tion and not merely a vehicle through which a plaintiff hopes to cir-
cumvent powerful defenses to other tort actions.
Of course, situations may arise where defenses to libel or inva-
sion of privacy fail, thus leaving a defendant vulnerable on two or
three theories of liability. Although conduct vulnerable to damages
for libel or invasion of privacy is not inherently vulnerable to dam-
ages for intentional infliction,127 it could be. This is especially true
when a public figure who is a plaintiff in a libel case or in an inva-
sion of privacy case has proved "actual malice" - publication of a
knowing or reckless falsehood. 128 Assuming that the plaintiff has also
demonstrated severe emotional harm, such proof would almost cer-
tainly amount to proof of the elements of an intentional infliction
claim. Given the Supreme Court's willingness to countenance even
punitive damage awards under such circumstances,129 and given the
court's willingness to treat emotional distress as damage compensa-
ble in libel actions, 3 ° there is no need to permit juries to award dam-
ages for intentional infliction in addition to libel or invasion of pri-
vacy. Juries should be instructed that damages in such situations are
to be awarded only on one theory of liability.
131
In all other situations, the existing common law principles work
an appropriate accommodation of the interests involved in inten-
tional infliction actions. And these "other situations" are precisely
those in which intentional infliction is most likely to be a truly inde-
pendent cause of action. Without resorting to first amendment abso-
lutism, it is difficult to fathom principles that would more appropri-
ately strike a balance between freedom of the press and freedom
from intentionally inflicted emotional distress. 32 In fact, the com-
mon law principles already make it more difficult for a plaintiff to
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress than for libel
or invasion of privacy. The number of cases resolved early in litiga-
tion indicates that dismissal and summary judgment are alive and
Feb. 4, 1984, at 37 (libel and intentional infliction suit for accurately reported but allegedly
defamatory remarks made during city council meeting dismissed, apparently on privilege
grounds).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 76-105.
128. See supra text accompanying note 80.
129. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 350.
130. Id.
131. Concededly, jury discretion may be difficult to control, and since awards may be
largely arbitrary anyway, such a requirement may have limited impact.
132. Intentional infliction defendants might even find it counterproductive to further
transfer the constitutional defenses available in libel and privacy suits. Such transfers might,
for example, lead courts to lower the fault requirements for private-figure intentional infliction
plaintiffs. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83. And the Supreme Court has explicitly
left open the question whether "truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal
liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 491.
well in intentional infliction suits. 13 3 Some claims for intentional in-
fliction appear undeniably legitimate and should not be absolutely
foreclosed.
As the media have learned in other contexts, no defense will
discourage every frivolous lawsuit. Perhaps the best defense is, as the
National News Council has suggested, a journalistic, not legal re-
sponse - "a convincing demonstration by the press of its capacity to
do its job responsibly without coercion."'3 4
VI. Summary
An increasing number of plaintiffs have been asserting claims
against mass media defendants on a theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, particularly during the past half-dozen years. Al-
though defendants have prevailed in the majority of cases, the law
remains relatively undeveloped. Meanwhile, the scope of the tort
makes it applicable to an almost infinitely broad range of media con-
duct. The following three recommendations would help guarantee
that intentional infliction represent a truly independent theory of lia-
bility, and that it not become an unwarranted and dangerous in-
fringement on first amendment freedom. First, publication of truth-
ful information obtained from open, public records or open
governmental proceedings should be privileged under the rationale of
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn. Publication of false information similarly
obtained should also be privileged so long as the report is fair and
accurate. Second, publication of material which, but for insurmount-
able defenses, would be actionable as libel or invasion of privacy
should be considered equally privileged against actions for inten-
tional infliction. Last, conduct involving neither libel nor invasion of
privacy should support an action for intentional infliction only upon
proof that the conduct was outrageous and that the defendant inten-
tionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional
distress. By following these recommendations, courts can accommo-
date appropriately the important interests in free expression and
emotional tranquility.
133. See generally supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
134. Council Warns, supra note 118, at 44.

